Monitoring results of rallies and gatherings held by far-right extremist groups



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Introduction

Dissemination of nationalistic narrative and misinformation by far-right extremist groups in Georgia jeopardizes social integration of minority-settled regions and holds the risk of fueling civil unrest. Against the backdrop of an ongoing conflict in Nagorno Karabakh and an information war waged in parallel, attempts to radicalize ethnic Armenians and Azerbaijanians residing in Georgia with narratives from outside of Georgia have become evident. Far-right, ultra-nationalist groups were the major ones to disseminate misinformation in most cases.

In view of the threats posed by activities of far-right groups, scrutiny of these groups remains a matter of special interest to the Democracy Research Institute. The Institute has been observing activity of far-right radical groups on social networks as well as their public gatherings and rallies since the end of last year.

This report covers monitoring results of rallies and gatherings of far-right groups in the period between December 2020 – June 2021. It analyzes trends identified by observing on the basis of observing six of such rallies and summarizes major findings. The report is aimed at preventing hate crime, hindering recruitment of new members by far-right radical groups and informing the public of threats these groups can pose if they gain more power.

Methodology

In the reporting period, DRI observers monitored all of the gatherings organized by far-right groups in Tbilisi. Our scope of interest also included gatherings in connection with the damaging of a cross on the Fortress of Gagi in Marneuli municipality. We have been getting information on upcoming rallies and counter-rallies from open sources and social networks far-right groupings and their leaders frequently use as a means of disseminating information and marshaling supporters.

Before taking on to the observation exercise, we developed a special form for monitoring gatherings and rallies. With this form, we were able to arrange and categorize violations and other important occurrences taking place during the gatherings. In view of project goals and objectives, we used the following methods of analysis:

1. Situational analysis. In the context of our research, we used situational analysis to observe important individual events taking place during far-right radical groups' gatherings and rallies, and to identify and understand major trends.

2. **Comparative analysis**. We employed comparative analysis to assess compatibility of practical aspects of rallies conducted by far-right extremist groups with the applicable law.

Our monitoring focused on the

- Use of hate speech by leaders of far-right groups or individuals taking part in their gatherings
- Upholding of public order by the police during the gatherings and rallies
- Detection of acts of disobedience to police orders
- Calls to violence against individual persons or groups.

We also assessed compatibility of the public gatherings and rallies held by far-right groups with the Georgia law and international standards envisaged by the European Convention on Human Rights.

1. Overview of the background situation

In 2020-2021, groups holding to far-right extremist ideologies became especially active. A 2020 report by the State Security Service states that threats posed by far-right extremist groups have reached a new critical landmark. [1]

The threats originated in both the global pandemic[2] and the government's incorrect policy of impunity that encouraged and strengthened radical ideology groups and caused them to become activated. The Democracy Research Institute has emphasized these threats not once in its reports and statements.[3]

As armed hostilities over Nagorno Karabakh renewed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, some far-right extremist groups capitalized on Azerbaijan's example coming forward with the proposal of restoring a strong unilateral rule.[4] Other extremist groups went on to underline potential threats Georgia as a multi-ethnic the country (with having Armenian and Azerbaijanian communities) could face.[5]

In the reporting period, far-right extremist groups were striving for exacerbating relations with the Azerbaijanian population in the municipalities of Dmanisi and Marneuli. Representatives of the groups and their leaders were going down to regions in person to bring about provocation and to provide for coverage of the events from an extremist narrative angle.

Ultra-right extremist groups made efforts to marshal their supporters by manipulating with sensitive topics in the society. Worth noting is their activity on the matter of Namakhvani hydropower plant. In February 2020, a decision of the Ministry of Environment Protection and Agriculture greenlighting construction of a cascade of hydroelectric power plants between Tvishi Village and Zhoneti Village in the Rioni Gorge engendered a massive protest on the part of the population.

Along with the public protest, 'The Georgian Idea', a far-right radical group, made an effort to obtain sympathy of the anti-Namakhvani protest rally organizers. Other radical groups such as 'the Georgian March' and 'Alt-Info' decided to stop cooperation with the anti-Namakhvani protesters after Varlam Goletiani, one of the leaders of the anti-Namakhvani protest rally, dissociated himself from the calls to expel Turks. In particular, Goletiani stated the Government activated the radical groups to discredit

[1] Georgia's State Security Service, Report, 2020, p. 29, accessible at https://parliament.ge/media/news/sakartvelos-sakhelmtsifo-usafrtkhoebis-samsakhuris-2020-tslis-sakmianobis-angarishi (last viewed 20.05.2021).
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] DRI, Results of monitoring of the rally outside the Amirani movie theater, accessible at http://www.democracyresearch.org/eng/88 (last viewed 20.05.2021).
[4] Levan Vasadze, Utopia as a Solution, accessible at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBH58xx0Wa8&t=1145s (last viewed 20.05.2021).
[5] Alt-Info, a far-right media association, discussing the act of repeated damaging of a cross on the Fortress of Gagi in Marneuli and threats posed by the altercation occurred in Dmanisi, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PAcQu-eEEIM ასევე https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMow-WJHFGA

the anti-power plant movement.[6] However, after Levan Vasadze's public statement of his intention to actively enter into politics, the Alt-Info group changed its mind to independently hold rallies against the Namakhvani power plant project and decided to join gatherings organized by the Rioni Gorge Keepers. The Georgian March announced, on the other hand, they would join Rioni Gorge Keepers' manifestation only upon the Keepers' "request" and would be ready to use "radical" methods.[7]

2021 saw continuation of the trend of individuals and groups known for their homophobic, xenophobic and nationalist rhetoric actively joining politics. Anti-liberal and anti-west-minded Georgian March and Georgian Idea, groups that had conducted some pre-election campaign, took part in the 2020 parliamentary election.[8] In May 2021, Levan Vasadze, a millionaire businessman and a World Congress of Families representative in Georgia, who had been continuously denying widespread rumors about his possible engagement in politics, founded a public movement called "Unity, Identity, Hope" confirming his readiness for taking part in elections and political processes.

2. Monitoring results

During the project, monitors from Democracy Research Institute observed six gatherings of far-right groups. All of the gatherings related to anti-migrant, homophobic and ethno-nationalist topics. The smallest in size – the one organized by `Georgian Nationalism', a youth neo-nationalist organization, was attended by about 10 protesters. On the other hand, the founding of the "Unity, Identity, Hope" movement by Businessman Levan Vasadze was the most sizeable with about 3,000 participants. Protesters' demands concerned timely investigation into the damaging of the cross on the Fortress of Gagi, suspension of activities of Public Defender and non-governmental organizations, termination of construction of large electric power plants in the Rioni Gorge between the villages of Tvishi and Zhoneti and, finally, bringing the entire territory around the Davit Gareja Monastery Complex into the territory of Georgia.

These gatherings were being scheduled through social networks and other media sources by Guram Palavandishvili, Chairman of Association for the Protection of Children; Levan Vasadze, Businessman; Sandro Bregadze, leader of an ultra-nationalist grouping called Georgian March; and Alt-Info, a television company. At almost all of these gatherings observed by the Democracy Research Institute, speakers were using hate language in their public calls. It should be mentioned that gatherings and manifestations arranged by the radical groups were not characterized with abundance of participants – a reason that prompted them to try to collect more supporters at other gatherings organized by other social or civic groups.

[6] 'They [the Government] activated radical groups themselves | Goletiani says his protesters have nothing to do with the xenophobic rally', https://publika.ge/tavad-gaaaqtiures-radikaluri-jgufebi-goletianis-tqmit-qsenofobiur-aqciastan-kavshiri-ar-aqvt/ (last viewed 21.05.2021).

[7] https://www.facebook.com/sandro.breg/posts/6343030449055764

[8] Democracy Research Institute, 'Protest rallies under scrutiny (within the frame of pre-election campaigns and after the Election Day), 2021, p. 21, accessible at http://www.democracyresearch.org/geo/527 (last viewed 21.05.2021).

2.1. A rally by a youth neo-nationalist organization on February 25

On 25 February 2021, hundredth anniversary of Georgia's occupation by Soviet Russia, a youth neo-nationalist organization named 'Georgian Nationalism' held a manifestation to honor the memory of Junkers [yùŋ-kərz: army cadets] who died in a battle for Georgia's independence on 25 February 1921 in Kojori.

The demonstrators gathered near the Marjanishvili Metro Station to march toward Public School no. 52 named after Georgian Junkers. Around 10 to 15 people attended the manifestation, mostly young men. Speakers' statements were strongly anti-Russian and ethno-nationalist.

In their speeches, organizers blamed politicians, especially those from the Georgian Dream and Unified National Movement, for polarizing the public and vowed to end their political career. One of the participants spoke of so-called "false dichotomy" created by non-governmental organizations, political parties and human rights defenders.

The demonstrators noticed a Democracy Research Institute's observer who they warned to never attend their gatherings for he/she was "a Jew".

The manifestation was policed by up to 10 patrol police officers. Gathered individuals neglected anti-Covid-19 safety rules (no face masks and no social distancing).

2.2. Risk of escalation on ethnic grounds in the municipalities of Marneuli and Dmanisi

In 2021, anti-Azerbaijanian and anti-Turk narratives of far-right extremist groups intensified.[9] In parallel to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh and the events concerning the Davit Gareji Monastery Complex in the pre-parliamentary election, the situation in ethnic Azerbaijanian districts of Georgia somewhat escalated begetting the risk of instrumentalization of ethnic issues. In this situation, far-right radical groups and their supporters zealously tried to fuel up this escalation between the parties and/or increase the number of their supporters by giving an extremist coverage as the events unfolded.

2.3. A violent rally by the Georgian March in front of the presidential palace

On 3 February 2021, the Georgian March, a far-right ultra-nationalist organization, conducted a protest rally near the presidential palace. As reasons for rallying, they were referring to construction of a highway to the Davit Gareji Monastery Complex by Azerbaijan and seizure by Azerbaijanian soldiers of caves in the monastery that had previously been dwelt by Georgian monks.

[9] Democracy Research Institute, 'Monitoring of gatherings and manifestations held by far-right extremist groups in Georgia, Tbilisi, 2020, p. 20, accessible at http://www.democracyresearch.org/files/52far%20right%20geo%202.pdf (last viewed 25.05.2021).

Around 100-150 people attended the protest rally, most of them being men. Some protesters were drunk.

In his speech, Sandro Bregadze, a leader of Georgian March, denounced President of Georgia Salome Zurabishvili for incompetence, betrayal and kindling a territory dispute between Georgia and Azerbaijan. Sandro Bregadze also stated the Georgian March was unable to enter the monastery complex due to some secret agreement between Georgian and Azerbaijanian governments. He announced marshalling about 1,000 people who would not obey Georgia's border authorities and, if necessary, would forcibly make their way into the Davit Gareji monastery complex.

While these statements were being made, Giorgi Gabedava, one of the Georgian March leaders and several of his supporters attempted to use force to break into the presidential palace. Giorgi Gabedava was arrested by the police for an administrative offense, which was met with bitterly reactions by other demonstrators. They tried to stop a police car by force calling police officers "slaves". At the beginning of the rally, about 20 police officers had been deployed to ensure control but this number proved to be insufficient when the Georgian March supporters decided to violently enter the presidential palace. Because of the inadequate number of police officers, they failed to prevent the demonstrators from breaking into the building and to arrest the offenders.

The rally organizers called on the demonstrators in the beginning of the event to adhere to Covid-19-related regulations (use facemasks and keep a social distance) but only a few protestants heeded the call.

2.4. (Alleged) theft of a cross erected on the Fortress of Gagi

On 26 January, a statement was posted on Facebook pages "Alilo in Marneuli" and "Marneuli Hujabi" that the cross barbarically stolen in the Diocese of Marneuli and Hujabi would be solemnly erected on 27 January with the blessing of Archbishop Giorgi Jamdeliani. [10] The event was preceded by confrontation between ethnic Azerbaijanians and members of the local diocese in Village Meore Kesalo, Marneuli Municipality.[11] The posts generated a lot of online comments and replies. The comments included some sharply anti-Azerbaijanian, ethno-nationalistic messages containing religious extremism and threats.

The events received coverage on the online media platform of Alt-Info, an ultra-right and ultra-nationalist group. Other far-right groups such as the Georgian March and the Georgian Idea also echoed the theft and the raising of a new cross in Marneuli. On 28 January, Georgian Idea published on its Facebook page a video from the Fortress of Gagi with a heading "A cross stolen by infidels".

Irakli Shikhiashvili and Levan Chachua, leaders of Georgian March and Georgian Idea, attended the ceremony of re-erecting the cross. Archbishop Giorgi Jamdeliani of the Diocese of Marneuli and Hujabi was distinguished with his use of hate language in talking to the local Azerbaijanian population.[12]

[10] 'Alilo in Marneuli', statement of 27 January 2021, accessible at https://www.facebook.com/359561074407687/photos/a.493765680987225/1339603239736794/

[11] 'My ancestors were here before your grandfather', Archbishop Giorgi telling to ethnic Azerbaijanians, accessible at https://tabula.ge/ge/news/661177-babuashenamde-chemi-mama-papa-iqo-ak-meupe-giorgi (last viewed 26.05.2021).

[12] *Ibid.*

Monitors from the Democracy Research Institute observed the process of the cross being re-erected. About 150 to 200 individuals, mostly local ethnic Georgian men, attended the ceremony. The ceremony went on against the backdrop of anti-Azerbaijanian messages and statements. At about 6 pm, Giorgi Jamdeliani, Archbishop of the Diocese of Marneuli and Hujabi, erected a new cross on the Fortress of Gagi. In their media speeches and interviews, leaders of far-right violent groups blamed the local Azerbaijanian village population in stealing the cross from the fortress.

Regulations for containing the Covid-19 virus (face masks and social distancing rules) were neglected at the gathering.

We wish to underline the authorities' ineffective policy in regard to such events. Commencement by the Interior Ministry of investigation into alleged theft of the cross under Article 177 of the Criminal Code did not have any suppressing or preventative effect on either the actual incidents or future occurrences of similar nature.[13] On 13 May, recordings were disseminated through social networks depicting damages inflicted on the newly-erected iron cross.[14] In view of the size and weight of both new and old iron crosses, it would most likely be impossible to damage and/or carry the crosses without special tools and coordinated action of a number of people.

2.5. Escalation risks in the municipality of Dmanisi

The massive unrest that started in Dmanisi on 17 May was followed by activation of far-right extremist groups. According to a statement made by the Interior Ministry, the situation exacerbated after a mundane conflict in one of the town shops grew into a confrontation between two larger groups of local population.[15] The local residents attacked each other with bats and stones. Police was called to the place but this did not prove to be sufficient to de-escalate the situation and separate the parties from each other.

The Georgian March, a far-right extremist group that arrived at the spot immediately, took on to escalating the tension.[16] The Alt-Info online media platform provided single-sided coverage of the events from an ethnic confrontation perspective.[17] The group leaders stated "ethnic Azerbaijanian Muslims present themselves as a continuous threat to country's unity and Georgian Christians should also demonstrate their standing together."

2.6. Attempts to radicalize anti-Namakhvani power plant demonstrators

In the reporting period, like in the previous years, far-right extremist groups tried to increase the number of their supporters by manipulating with sensitive topics in the society. Of special importance

[13] Investigation into disappearance of the cross from the Gagi Fortress commenced under the charges of theft, accessible at https://www.marneulifm.ge/ka/marneuli/article/39333-gagis-cikhidan-gamqral-jvarze-gamodzieba-qurdobis-mukhlith-daitsyo (last viewed: 25.05.2021).

[14] 'The cross on the Fortress of Gagi in Marneuli was damaged: What do we know this far?', accessible at https://netgazeti.ge/news/542062/ (last viewed (25.05.2021).

[15] Statement by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 17 May 2021, accessible at https://police.ge/ge/shinagan-saqmeta-saministros-gantskhadeba/14630 (last viewed 27.05.2021).

[16] See https://www.facebook.com/sandro.breg/videos/6271958912829585

[17] See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBfDSuyg9PA

from this perspective is the activity of far-right groups in regard to the Namakhvani power plants project.

Agriculture Ministry's decision in February 2020 to greenlight large-scale construction of electric power plants in the gorge of Rioni River between villages Tvishi and Zhoneti gave rise to massive protests on the part of the residents of local municipalities in Tskaltubo and Tsageri. The protest movement was quickly joined by groups of population from Georgia's various regions. A number of non-governmental organizations and civic movements declared their support for the protestants.

A the public protest was ongoing, a far-right radical group called 'Georgian Idea' made attempts to earn the support of the protest rally organizers. Other groups such as 'the Georgian March" and 'Alt-Info' decided to stop cooperation with the anti-Namakhvani protesters after Varlam Goletiani, one of the leaders of the anti-Namakhvani protest rally, dissociated himself from calls to expel Turks stating that the Government activated the radical groups to discredit the anti-power plant movement.[18]

In order to increase the number of supporters by leveraging the ongoing protest, the Alt-Info group decided to independently stage rallies demanding that construction of the Namakhvani electric plants be halted immediately. The group representatives did not exclude the possibility of using force during the rallies.[19] However, after Levan Vasadze who had recently entered into politics called on his supporters to join gatherings staged by Rioni Gorge Keepers, Alt-Info TV Company's group cancelled their own rallies and re-joined the anti-Namakhvani movement.

Rioni Gorge Keepers' gatherings were joined by Guram and Alexandre Palavandishvilis, leaders of 'Georgian Idea'. On 23 May, after the anti-Namakhvani movement moved to Tbilisi, the Palavandishvilis attended all the rallies directed against the power plant construction. At one of the rallies, representatives of 'Georgian Idea' verbally and physically insulted members of a civic movement and LGBT community. In particular:

- On 23 May, a young man who was taking part in a protest rally against the Namakhvani power plants had his earring violently ripped off by other protesters.
- On 23 May, Alexandre Palavandishvili forcibly tore a poster which queer activites were holding in support of the anti-Namakhvani rally.[20]
- On 24 May, they attacked activists of the "Shame on you" movement and tried to violently evict them from the rally on the ground that one of the activists wore an arm band in support of the LGBT community.[21]

These incidents caused some supporters to distance themselves from the anti-Namakhvani power plant movement. To avoid confrontation and prevent the protest movement from falling apart, the protest organizers condemned violence and decided only State symbols would be allowed during their

[18] 'They [the Government] activated radical groups themselves | Goletiani says his protesters have nothing to do with the xenophobic rally', accessible at https://publika.ge/tavad-gaaaqtiures-radikaluri-jgufebi-goletianis-tqmit-qsenofobiur-aqciastan-kavshiri-ar-aqvt/ (last viewed 21.05.2021).

[19] Protest rally against Namakhvani power plants at the Government Administration Building, May 9, 2pm, accessible at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jYKKqsloWYY&t=34s
(last viewed 22.05.2021).

[20] Homophobically-minded groups disallowed LGBT community representatives to join the protest rally against the Namakhvani power plant construction, accessible at https://rustavi2.ge/ka/news/199778 (last viewed 28.05.2021).

[21] Activists who wore LGBT arm bands to the rally were confronted by Palavandisvhili and his supporters, accessible at https://formulanews.ge/News/50858 (last viewed 27.05.2021).

rallies.[22] Maka Suladze, one of the leaders of the anti-power plant movement, openly confronted Guram and Alexandre Palavandishvilis for their aggression toward rally participants and homophobic statements.[23]

To summarize, we wish to note that far-right extremist groups succeeded in sowing discord among the protesters against Namakhvani power plant construction. Homophobic actions at the rally generated civil society's criticism of the anti-power plant movement.

2.7. Far-right radical groups galvanized ahead of parliamentary elections

In 2021, anti-liberal and anti-West-minded far-right, extremist forces continued to actively join politics. The Georgian March and the Georgian Idea took part in the 2020 parliamentary election. In May 2021, Businessman Levan Vasadze founded a public movement called "Unity, Identity, Hope" confirming his readiness for taking part in elections and political processes.

The founding ceremony of the public movement entitled "Unity, Identity, Hope" was held on 16 May in 9 April Public Park. Around 3,000 people attended, including women and children – something that is not common at gatherings organized by far-right radical groups. The organizers said they wanted the event to be of an aesthetic, not of a violent nature. Participants' speeches did not contain homophobic calls. In his speech, Levan Vasadze denounced Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations stating Georgia's sovereignty would suffer if Georgia joined NATO and that it was necessary to launch a dialogue with Russia.

At the rally, Levan Vasadze called on President of Georgia Salome Zurabishvili to resign because she had pardoned members and supporters of the National Movement. He also confirmed his support for the anti-Namakhvani power plant movement. He said he had told a Turkish ambassador who he had met to discuss the power plant issue that no power plant would be built without local residents' approval. Finally, Levan Vasadze called on his supporters to attend a rally organized by the anti-power plant movement.

3. Inadequate response from authorities and investigation's neglect of the intolerance motive

Monitoring revealed the authorities' incomprehensive and deficient policy on multi-ethnic regions.

For the purpose of avoiding an ethnic conflict, the Government did not accord due attention to investigating potential hate motive in the theft of the cross – a Christian symbol – from the Fortress of Gagi and later in the infliction of damage to the re-raised cross on the Fortress. Instead, the Interior Ministry opened a criminal case under Article 177 of the Criminal Code (theft) in regard to the first incident and under Article 187 of the Criminal Code (damaging or destroying someone else's property) in regard to the second incident.

[22] Only State symbols are allowed at our rallies, Goletiani comments on confrontation, accessible at https://mtavari.tv/news/44615-chvens-aktsiebze-dashvebulia-mkholod-sakhelmcipos (last viewed 27.05.2021)
[23] https://fb.watch/5LK_NztGsI/

Neither at the time of opening the criminal cases nor at a later stage did the Interior Ministry take into account the existence of a number of hate crime indicators such as:

- The fact that the cross was stolen or damaged on religious or ethnic motives;
- Public perception of the fact: a major part of the local population perceived the act as a hate-motivated offense;
- Time and place of the crimes (theft of and infliction of damages to the cross): both incidents happened on or around important religious dates (the day of Saint Nino on 27 January and Kurban Bayram);
- The object of the crimes: both offenses were directed against a religious symbol erected on a historic fortress;
- Lack of any other motive: In view of the size and weight of the cross, it would be next impossible to damage and/or carry it without using special tools and coordinated action of a number of people. The intent of making pecuniary profit after taking illegal possession of the item (the cross) is also very unlikely in this case.

The State must conduct a prompt and effective investigation into offenses potentially committed on intolerance (hate) motives when circumstances of the case reasonably indicate the existence of such motives. Also, hate crimes (and speculation by ultra-conservative groups, clergy people and other societal groups with hate crimes) are directed against a concrete group of people, which undermines social cohesion and integration, encourages confrontation among various groups and provokes retaliatory attacks.[24]

According to the guidelines developed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), recognition of the existence of the intolerance (hate) motive at early stages of investigation is crucial for the purposes of detection and suppression of hate crimes. Otherwise, key evidence will be lost and investigation will end up with no success.[25]

In view of the circusmstaces preceding the theft of the cross, the Government's passiveness is alarming. As authorities remain inactive to show proper response, extremist narratives and radicalization spreads further deepening confrontation between local communities and giving rise to a serious threat of escalation. The Democracy Research Institute has made numerous statements about threats posed by government's intentional neglect of the problem well before the events developed in the Dmanisi municipality.[26]

No less alarming is how radical extremist groups are manipulating with the problem. In relation to the events in Dmanisi, in its statement of 17 May 2021, the Interior Ministry in effect confirmed there were interested parties out there who had given a try to artificially weave a mundane life conflict into an ethnic confrontation.[27] Nevertheless, the authorities did not adopt proper response to actions of these groups.

Authorities' neglect of the problem encourages and augments the credibility of radicalizing, discriminatory, Islamophobic, chauvinist and extremist narratives. Calls made by far-right extremist

[24] OSCE/ ODIHR, Prosecuting Hate Crimes, a Practical Guide, 2014, P.16.
[25] *Ibid*, p. 45.
[26] DRI comments on the alleged theft of the cross in the Diocese of Marneuli and Hujabi, accessible at http://www.democracyresearch.org/geo/504 (last viewed (27.05.2021).
[27] Statement by the Interior Ministry, 17 May 2021, accessible at https://police.ge/ge/shinagan-saqmeta-saministros-gantskhadeba/14630 (last viewed 27.05.2021).

media outlets and groups call for Government's adequate response with a view to avoiding further radicalization and ethnic confrontation.

Recommendations

For the Interior Ministry and the Prosecution Office:

- Detect and investigate crimes motivated by intolerance (hatred) in shortest timeframes possible
- Stop tolerating violent groups; pay due attention to suppressing and examining actions of these groups directed at escalating and de-stabilizing the situation;
- Immediately after relevant indicators are detected in an investigation, officially recognize the hate motive of the crime to demonstrate that it is the Government's policy to eradicate tension, de-escalate the situation and prevent radical narratives from penetrating into local communities.