The Democracy Research Institute is responding to the annual report of the State Security Service. DRI still finds it problematic how the State Security Service responds to far-right extremism, as well as the fact that the mandate to investigate and, in particular, to investigate corruption crimes, is granted to an agency having an intelligence function, and the lack of adequate parliamentary oversight mechanisms over the service.

The 2020 report of the State Security Service was presented by the First Deputy Head of the Service at the joint sitting of three parliamentary committees on April 26. Given the essence of this crucial parliamentary oversight mechanism, it is important that the report be submitted immediately by the head of the service.[1]

After the presentation of the general part of the report, the question-and-answer mode was held in a closed format, which is a vicious and suspicious practice, given that most of the people present at the sitting do not have access to confidential information anyway.

Unlike the reports of previous years, the structure of the 2020 report of the State Security Service has been improved, which should be assessed as a step forward.

Wrong policies pursued towards ultra-right extremist groups

The report notes that the threat posed by the far-right extremism has reached a new, critical level.[2]

In its reports and statements, the Democracy Research Institute has repeatedly pointed out the strengthening of the radical ideological groups as a result of the wrong policies pursued by the State. These groups, encouraged by impunity, have recently become active and dangerous.[3] The delayed launch of investigations against leaders of far-right extremist groups, allowing these individuals to mobilize large numbers of forces and commit new offences, should be particularly emphasized. When evaluating the efforts of the State Security Service in terms of combating far-right extremism, the following problematic aspects should be highlighted:

1. Inadequate regulatory framework and the threat of persecution of people with different opinions - Unlike previous year's reports, the 2020 report devotes a separate chapter to far-right extremism and describes in more detail the threat posed by Russia in this regard. This is undoubtedly a step forward and deserves a positive assessment, given that the associations of this ideology are the main source of the spread of disinformation, radicalization and extremist ideology in Georgia. It should be noted, however, that there is no legislative definition of far-right extremist ideology. Without a proper regulatory framework, following and prosecuting members of these groups pose a risk of persecution of critics, including the media and non-governmental organizations. It should be noted that the investigations launched by the State Security Service into the cases of disinformation and discrimination on ethnic and national grounds are directed not against the far-right extremist groups or their leaders, but against critical media outlets and NGOs.[4]

Indicating in the State Security Service report that specific individuals have been exposed of the named actions, without providing the relevant evidentiary standard, may serve to discredit these organizations and call into question the independence of the service.

2019. B) Insufficient involvement of the society in the fight against extremist ideology - The attempt to improve the quality of cooperation between the State Security Service and the civil sector deserves a positive assessment. Nevertheless, civil society is not sufficiently involved in the fight against violent extremism. It should be noted that the Democracy Research Institute has been requesting, through the court, declassification of the action plan (or part of it) developed within the framework of the Georgian National Strategy on Combating Terrorism since 2019. Without access to this action plan (or part of it), it will be impossible to outline the areas of potential cooperation or plan relevant projects, which cast doubt on the achievement of the goals of the strategy and the involvement of the society in the fight against radicalization and extremism.[5]

Anti-corruption agency and fight against corruption

Performing investigative, and especially anti-corruption, functions by a body with intelligence power is problematic, as has been repeatedly pointed out by the non-governmental sector. As a rule, the activities of the security services are characterized by a high degree of secrecy, which reduces the possibility of democratic control/oversight over them. Accordingly, security services should be strictly limited to the protection of the national security interest and should not carry out activities that are not closely linked with national security.

The State Security Service report states that corruption in public institutions endangers national security.[6] The explanation of the Service that any corruption offence poses a threat to national interests is inconsistent with both the best anti-corruption practices of different countries and the explanations of the European Court of Human Rights.[7] The 2020 report of the State Security Service clearly illustrates that the vast majority of cases investigated by the Service's Anti-Corruption Agency do not involve risks to the national security of the State or its interests.[8]

In addition, the 2020 report of the State Security Service does not make it clear in which case the Service’s Anti-Corruption Agency launches an investigation and in which case it sends a case to other structures.[9] In one of the cases, the State Security Service detected an attempted fraud in large amount committed by a group, which did not belong to the investigative jurisdiction of the State Security Service and definitely did not fall under its competence.[10]

Operational-Technical Agency and personal data protection

According to the report, "During the reporting year, the State Inspector had been provided with all information requested in accordance with law and all the conditions necessary for the effective exercise of the Inspector's authority had been provided." Apart from this general information, the report says nothing about: How many times, by what methods or in what form was the Agency inspected by the supervisory body. It should be noted that the State Inspector's Office supervises only covert investigative activities carried out in accordance with law. Preventing and combating the illegal collection of personal data by investigative bodies is beyond the competence of this service.

According to the 2020 report, the LEPL Operational-Technical Agency, carries out its duties under proper supervision, and in compliance with human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, there are a number of questions relating to the Agency's activities.[11]

Although the key to covert investigative activities is in the hands of the Operational-Technical Agency operating under the State Security Service, the report says nothing about the illegally obtained secret telephone or video recordings that have taken become a tool of political retaliation.[12]

Cyber ​​security[13]

The report provides information about the cyber attack on the computer system of the Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Labour, Health and Social Affairs of Georgia and the illegal acquisition of important information from the database of the Richard Lugar Public Health Research Center. Although cyber security is considered an integral part of national security according to the report, it is unclear exactly what actions were carried out by the service against this crime. The cyber crimes are investigated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Georgia.[14]

According to the report, in order to solve the problems related to cyber security, it is necessary to adopt the draft law of Georgia on the amendments to the Law of Georgia on Information Security. The interest of the State Security Service towards the bill is natural, as it gives the service broad and uncontrolled powers.[15] It should be noted that the bill is being discussed in the Parliament. Although the Georgian Government has not adopted a resolution on Georgia's national cyber ​​security strategy and action pan since 2017, the report says nothing about the need for its adoption.  

Conclusion

In view of the above, DRI considers it important to ensure the following:

• Improvement in the quality of cooperation between the State Security Service and the civil sector;
• The State Security Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairs should ensure a tough and fair approach to perpetrators of hate crimes;
• The far-right extremist ideology should be defined at the legislative level and investigation of the violent acts committed by the leaders of these ideological groups should be conducted in the shortest period of time;
• Complete or partial declassification of the action plan developed within the framework of the Georgian National Strategy on Combating Terrorism at the initiative of the State Security Service;
• The State Security Service should be deprived of the authority to investigate corruption crimes (before legislative changes are made, the Anti-Corruption Agency of the State Security Service should investigate only cases that pose an immediate threat to national security);
• The State Security Service should focus on the illegally obtained secret recordings, as well as causes, responses and possible solutions, in its parliamentary reports;
• The annual reports of the State Security Service should indicate the form, frequency and methods of inspection of the LEPL Operational-Technical Agency by the State Inspector;
• A national cyber ​​security strategy and action plan should be developed for an effective fight against cybercrime, with the participation of non-governmental sector and experts.

[1] The Head of the State Security Service was obliged to submit a report according to the regulations valid before 2017, contrary to the current Rules and Procedures of the Parliament.

[2] State Security Service Report 2020, p. 29

[3] http://www.democracyresearch.org/geo/88

[4]https://civil.ge/ka/archives/357369?fbclid=IwAR2NB_cnbDYqz5Q0k7OAinPRfpikJcQmsZRyZbyxVmvSwT9URRhMbn-R6FA

[5] Http://www.democracyresearch.org/geo/103

[6] State Security Service Report 2020, p. 20.

[7] DRI, State Security Service - Duplication of Competencies and Parallel Investigation Systems, Tbilisi, 2020, p. 17-18, available at: http://www.democracyresearch.org/geo/367

[8] State Security Service Report 2020, p. 34-36

[9] Ibid. p. 34

[10] Ibid. p. 36

[11] DRI, Mandate of the Operational-Technical Agency in Conducting Covert Investigative Activities - Risks and Challenges, 2020, available at: http://www.democracyresearch.org/geo/442

[12] See the statement of the Democracy Research Institute - http://www.democracyresearch.org/geo/547

[13] State Security Service Report 2020 - http://parliament.ge/ge/ajax/downloadFile/151521/1-4905.pdf 23

[14] The investigation into the cyber attack carried out on September 1, 2020 was launched under Article 284 of the Criminal Code. See https://police.ge/ge/saqartvelos-shinagan-saqmeta-saministros-gantskhadeba/13926

[15] See the statement of the Democracy Research Institute  - http://www.democracyresearch.org/geo/409?fbclid=IwAR234JvCDh5ZRN3X4i9RtrUijK9oxsTgxqRWA43MnBOJU0MXVZZUXqgIefo