Based on the
study and analysis of hundreds of messages, video and photo materials received
from observers about election violations, we would like to present information
about the election fraud scheme that was used during the parliamentary
elections. The monitoring mission notes that, in addition to the mentioned
scheme, there were also other schemes (use of criminal groups to pressure voters,
bribery of voters and pressure on them in various forms) aimed at falsifying
the elections and obtaining the desired number of votes.
This scheme is
confirmed by more than 370 photos and video materials provided by observers,
written complaints of observers and testimonies of eyewitnesses. In addition to
the above, based on public sources, we have collected hundreds of photos,
videos and audio materials showing election violations. We will publicize the
mentioned photo and video material, transfer it to the media, and also share it
with the international community.
During the
election day, we received more than 900 reports from our observers from 1131
polling stations about violations of election procedures. In 196 precincts
where our representatives observed the elections, significant violations had a
repeated, continuous and systematic nature, which had a significant impact on
the results of the elections.
In particular,
we have obtained evidence confirming that the following pre-planned, organized fraud
scheme was in operation, for which preparations began before the elections, in
particular:
· Firstly, the CEC, without public
discussions and consultation with the involved parties, single-handedly and
arbitrarily changed the rule established by the Election Code and instead of
identifying the function of registrars by drawing lots on the day of the
elections, it determined the deadline for the drawing of lots 1 week before the
elections. It was impossible for most of the monitoring organizations to
observe the mentioned process;
· Along with the process of formation of
voter lists, reports and evidences about rental of voters' ID cards or
collection of personal data in different ways and other forms of processing by
the ruling party have increased on a large scale;
· Despite numerous calls for the
investigation authorities to act on the above-mentioned facts, they were
absolutely inactive;
· Despite the CEC's public promise that
there would be no interruptions in monitoring the verification process, on the
day of voting, the opposite was the reality at the polling stations: in total,
the registration tables were stuck to the wall in such a way that it was
impossible for the observers to fully observe the process. Where our observers
had the opportunity to stand behind the verification machines, the commission
members indicated that they should move away from the location, as they were not
allowed to observe from that location. In some cases, our observers were
expelled from the sites for observing the verification process.
The scheme of
election fraud on the day of voting at the polling stations was as follows:
· Some of the voters who came to the
polling station had a piece of paper with another person's personal number
written on it, placed in their passport or stuck on their ID card; Also, the
voter is able to vote through a photocopy of the ID card in the phone;
· Fraudulent voters had allied registrars
at the polling stations who: a) had to quickly enter the personal number
written on the paper into the verification machine; b) and should not have been
marked or should have been marked poorly;
· In this falsification scheme, the
falsifier needed to avoid inking the ballot as much as possible so that he
could use the same scheme to go to another precinct and participate in the
election again. Consequently, the inking, which is and in this case should have
been an insurance mechanism against falsification in the verification process,
was not carried out;
· Moreover: voters were admitted to the
polling stations without inking checks, inking fluid was not used, manipulation
during inking was also observed - during inking, by covering the voter with a
finger or a napkin, the inking fluid did not get on the voter's hand;
· In some cases, the inking fluid and the
quality of the flashlight were not appropriate: there were no traces of inking
or it was easily torn off, and the flashlights were out of order - it was
necessary to replace the elements, etc.
· The falsifier and the registrar were
facilitated by the arrangement of the registrars' desks in the voting room,
which made it impossible to observe the process. Along with such
infrastructure, the members of the commission and the chairman categorically
forbade the observers to approach the desks of the registrars. When approaching
the table, there were several cases of the observers being pushed out of the
area;
· In the process of falsifying the
elections, the so-called Observers of the GoNGO organization, who had three
tasks:
o Further help neutralize the observers;
o Together with the representatives of the
ruling party, counterfeiters mobilized near the precinct were brought to the
precincts;
o If necessary, create chaos in the area,
allowing the registrar and the falsifier to carry out the verification process
inconspicuously and deliver the ballot to the falsifier without interruption.
· All of the above allowed the falsifier
to vote with the received ballot and place the ballot in an electronic or
non-electronic box;
· This rigging scheme does not cause the
imbalance that characterizes other carousels that need to remove ballots from
the precinct.
Despite
extremely limited surveillance, the creation of a hostile environment, and
attempts at physical, verbal and psychological abuse and intimidation, the
observers managed to identify the main trends in the scheme and document
evidence that exposed this fraud scheme and its scale.
Complaints
about the invalidity of the results of 189 precincts in various electoral
districts have been prepared and are being submitted to the District Election
Commissions. The total number of voters in these precincts exceeds 300,000. Our
lawyers continue to work on filing additional appeals to annul the results, and
therefore this number will increase.
The evidence
collected by the observation mission contains information about the crime of
electoral fraud. Accordingly, we appeal to the investigative agencies to start
an investigation of election fraud.
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The Anti-Corruption Bureau was established in 2022 in response to recommendations issued by the European Commission, which called for strengthening the independence and functional capacity of anti-corruption institutions.