Analyses
Law on Grants: 2025 Restrictions and the March 2026 Expansion
05.10.2026

The Law on Grants is not a standalone regulation. It forms part of a layered legislative framework developed since 2023 that also includes the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence (2024), the Foreign Agents Registration Act (2025), and accompanying amendments to the Administrative Offences and Criminal Codes.[1] Together, these measures substantially expand state regulation of the registration, funding and activities of independent organisations, media and individuals and raise concerns regarding legal certainty and the “quality of law” requirements.

These measures create mutually reinforcing regulatory and enforcement mechanisms. Organisations may be subject to registration and disclosure requirements, restrictions on access to foreign funding, administrative or criminal sanctions for non-compliance, and, in certain circumstances, criminal investigation under national-security provisions, including “sabotage,” “assisting a foreign state or organisation in hostile activities,” “treason,” and the recently introduced offence of “extremism against the constitutional order of Georgia.” Some of these offences carry sentences ranging from seven years to life imprisonment.

This framework is no longer merely prospective. Since 2025, the Prosecutor’s Office has frozen the accounts of human rights organisations in investigations relying on sabotage-related allegations and has opened criminal investigations involving named civil-society organisations and their representatives.[1] The legislative framework has meanwhile expanded the circumstances in which foreign funding and related activities may give rise to administrative or criminal liability.

In DRI’s assessment, these developments substantially restrict the legal and financial space available to independent civil society and create concrete legal risks for organisations and individuals operating within it. Georgia has not experienced the scale of arrests or closures of civil-society organisations observed in some more consolidated authoritarian systems in the wider Eurasian region, including Russia, Belarus and Azerbaijan. That distinction remains important. At the same time, the absence of enforcement on that scale does not diminish the significance of the legal powers already created or of the enforcement measures already undertaken.[2]



[1]Prosecution Service of Georgia, 17 March 2025 (initiating the criminal investigation against CSO groups, including Human Rights House Foundation) and 29 April 2025 (freezing bank accounts / initiating house and personal searches) statements, available at https://pog.gov.ge/news/saqartvelos-prokuraturis-gantskhadeba-4736 and https://pog.gov.ge/news/saqartvelos-prokuraturis-gantskhadeba-4770

[2]In December 2025, following the release of a BBC Eye investigation titled “When Water Burns – The Fight for Georgia,” Georgian authorities summoned local experts, witnesses, human rights defenders, and journalists in connection with an investigation into alleged “assistance to a foreign organisation in hostile activities”, the crime envisaged by Criminal Code Article 319. The State Security Service of Georgia launched an investigation following suggestions made in the documentary that the state had used the prohibited chemical CN gas (“Camite”) during the dispersal of protests in Georgia in December 2024. After spending only five days determining that no chemicals had been used, the State Security Service closed the investigation into abuse of official powers (Criminal Code Article 333), while keeping open the investigation under Criminal Code Article 319. See: Amnesty International, “Georgia: Government’s alleged use of toxic chemicals against protestors calls for international investigation and complete embargo on all policing equipment”, 5 December 2025, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/12/georgia-governments-alleged-use-of-toxic-chemicals-against-protestors-calls-for-international-investigation-and-complete-embargo-on-all-policing-equipment/; State Security Service, “Briefing in the State Security Service”, 06 December 2025, available at https://ssg.gov.ge/news/1060/brifingi-saxelmtsifo-usafrtxoebis-samsaxurshi

On 17 March 2026, the State Security Service summoned former Ombudsperson and human rights defender Ucha Nanuashvili over his communications with the OSCE Moscow Mechanism Special Rapporteur, days after she published a critical report on the deteriorating human rights situation in Georgia as part of her mandate. See Civil.ge, “Ex-Ombudsman Summoned to SSSG Over ‘Communication’ With Moscow Mechanism Expert”, 17 March 2026, available at https://civil.ge/archives/725520


[1]JamNews, “Expert assesses Georgian Dream’s 2024–2026 laws targeting civil society”, 05 March 2026, available at  https://jam-news.net/expert-assesses-georgian-dreams-2024-26-laws-targeting-civil-society/


Law on Grants: 2025 Restrictions and the March 2026 Expansion

სექტემბერი — ოკუპირებულ აფხაზეთსა და სამხრეთ ოსეთში რუსული გავლენების გაფართოების თვე

სექტემბერი ოკუპირებული სამხრეთ ოსეთისა და აფხაზეთში რუსული გავლენების გაფართოების თვედ შეგვიძლია მივიჩნიოთ. 

06.10.2026
Alleged Sexual Violence against Giorgi Davitadze - Call for an Immediate and Effective Investigation

We call on the authorities to respond immediately, effectively and comprehensively to the serious allegations made by Giorgi Davitadze, a prisoner was subjected to sexual violence, including rape, by staff members of the penitentiary institution.

02.10.2026
სამხრეთ ოსეთისთვის ახალი ფინანსური პაკეტი: ინფრასტრუქტურიდან სოციალურ მხარდაჭერამდე — როგორ იცვლება რუსეთის დაფინანსების პრიორიტეტები

ოკუპირებულს სამხრეთ ოსეთში რუსეთი ფინანსური “მხარდაჭერის” ახალ ეტაპს იწყებს. 

17.09.2026