September can be regarded as a month of expanding Russian influence in occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In de facto South Ossetia, presidential elections were held, unsurprisingly, with the winning of the Kremlin’s “appointed” candidate, who has already actively begun strengthening the policy of South Ossetia’s “rapprochement” with Russia. Meanwhile, in de facto Abkhazia, the so-called Independence Day was celebrated, with Russia once again declared the main “partner and supporter”.

Against this backdrop, another coordinated move by both regions and their demand for legally binding guarantees of the non-use of force have attracted particular attention.

Russia, occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia jointly demanded that Georgia provide legally binding guarantees of the non-use of force.

On 23 September, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin met with de facto Abkhaz Foreign Minister Oleg Bartsits and Konstantine Kochiev, State Adviser to the de facto President of South Ossetia. The meeting took place within the framework of the International Discussions on Security and Stability in Transcaucasia. The press release issued following the meeting emphasised that resolving the conflicts is impossible without developing legally binding guarantees. Therefore, it is essential that Tbilisi formally confirm its commitment not to use force against the two republics and that Georgia develop “legally binding guarantees” of the non-use of force. The statement also refers to the delimitation and subsequent demarcation of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian state borders.

This demand is not new and has been repeatedly voiced in statements by representatives of Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in recent years. For example, in June 2018, following another round of the Geneva International Discussions, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that representatives of Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia had coordinated their positions during discussions on the non-use of force by Georgia. According to the Russian agency, the parties also stated that they considered the growing NATO presence in the region unacceptable and reserved the right to take “appropriate countermeasures”.

Thus, the two main issues highlighted in the statement of 23 September 2026 — guarantees of the non-use of force by Georgia and the delimitation and demarcation of borders between Georgia and Abkhazia-South Ossetia — represent a continuation of issues raised by representatives of Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in international security discussions in previous years. At the same time, there is a significant difference in the wording of the 2026 statement: the current demand explicitly concerns legally binding guarantees, whereas previous statements primarily focused on an agreement on the non-use of force and ensuring its implementation within the relevant international framework.

The process of intensifying the Kremlin’s pressure and control over the occupied regions continues. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is holding a meeting on 1 October with Akhsar Jioyev, the de facto Foreign Minister of occupied South Ossetia. Information about this meeting was released in advance by the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian Ambassador to the region.

At the meeting, the parties will discuss bilateral coordination on international platforms (including within the framework of the Geneva International Discussions). According to the Russian side, the agenda includes promoting the interests of the so-called South Ossetia and security issues.

These negotiations are taking place against the backdrop of the agreement between Russia and the Tskhinvali region “On Deepening Alliance and Integration”, recently ratified by Moscow (in May 2026).

An interesting contrast is the fact that, while Russia is intensifying full-scale integration and pressure in the occupied regions, it continues to pursue a “friendly” and “good-neighbourly” policy towards Georgia — as evidenced by the visit of a Russian delegation to the Georgian Patriarchate on 28–29 September. Information about this visit became known through Russian sources. Unfortunately, the Georgian side only commented on the visit after media reports had emerged and portrayed the meeting with clergy from the occupying country in a positive light.

Despite the seemingly “good-neighbourly” gestures towards Tbilisi and the “friendly” policy demonstrated through visits to the Georgian Patriarchate, the Kremlin’s main strategy is becoming clear. Alongside its use of soft power and diplomatic manoeuvres towards Georgia, Russia is persistently seeking to consolidate its full control and legal leverage over the occupied regions, ultimately aiming at the de facto annexation of these territories. This is clearly evident from the activities carried out in September alone.