On 23 June, the de facto president, Alan Gagloev, addressed
the population via a video message informing them of his resignation. The
longstanding dissatisfaction of the Kremlin with Gagloev’s administration
ultimately culminated in his resignation.
As had been reported by various sources, Moscow had been
demanding that Gagloev step down. The de facto leader did not find it easy to
make this decision. Prior to leaving office, Gagloev nevertheless managed to
reward members of his entourage and distribute favours: he granted general
ranks, transferred land plots, buildings, and decommissioned high-value
official SUVs at a symbolic price (approximately 600 GEL). It is noteworthy
that Alexander Chochiyev, head of the so-called Customs Committee, whom he had
promoted, was detained on Russian territory only a few days after receiving his
rank on charges of bribery.
Among the current authorities, only Gagloev himself received
security guarantees from the Kremlin. He was appointed as an adviser to the
President of the Russian Federation; however, according to the Kremlin’s press
secretary, Dmitry Peskov, his specific functions have not yet been defined.
Until the elections, the duties of the de facto president are
being carried out by Marat Kambolov, a trusted figure of the Kremlin. From his
very first day in office, he has actively begun work and announced plans to
address regional issues, including gasification, increases in salaries and
pensions, and resolving the kilometre-long queues at the Zaramag checkpoint.
Despite this activity, Kambolov’s first personnel decision
triggered significant dissatisfaction among local residents. He appointed Alan
Alborov, a former head of administration and one of the key figures in
Gagloev’s team, as an adviser, whereas local public demand has been for a
complete replacement of the existing administrative personnel in the so-called
ministries.
Gagloev’s resignation has received wide coverage in Georgian
media and public discourse. Some analysts have linked the development to the
possible annexation of South Ossetia. A contrasting view has emerged in
Tskhinvali. A section of the local population fears that Moscow may be
preparing the region for a return to Tbilisi’s control. Against this backdrop
of uncertainty, the Georgian authorities have opted for complete silence and
have made no assessments regarding the Kremlin’s political course. This comes
in a context where an allied agreement between the so-called South Ossetia and
the Kremlin was signed on 9 May.
In the context of the ongoing political crisis, the Democracy
Research Institute calls on the Georgian Dream government to raise the issue of
the anticipated annexation of so-called South Ossetia at the 67th round of the
Geneva International Discussions (GID) on 1 July.
რუსეთისა და ე.წ. აფხაზეთის მთავრობებს შორის 2030 წლამდე მოქმედი შეთანხმება წლის დასაწყისში გაფორმდა.
რუსეთში საწვავის დეფიციტით გამოწვეული პრობლემები აფხაზეთზეც აისახა.
დე ფაქტო სამხრეთ ოსეთში ვადამდელი საპრეზიდენტო არჩევნები 2026 წლის 18 სექტემბერს გაიმართება.