Recently, Russia has been actively seeking to
bring the issue of the occupied territories to the forefront and to secure
their legal separation from Georgia. The Kremlin’s recent initiatives include
relocating the Geneva International Discussions to another venue it considers
neutral, demanding legally binding guarantees from Georgia on the non-use of
force against Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region, and involving Tbilisi in
various formats of regional cooperation. Against this backdrop, the expansion
of the mandate of the Georgian Prime Minister’s Special Representative for
Relations with Russia warrants particular attention, as it may have
implications both for the restoration of diplomatic relations and for the
future of the Geneva negotiations.
Relocation of the Geneva
International Discussions – Moscow’s New Initiative
Russia continues to actively
raise the issue of changing the venue of the Geneva International Discussions.
According to Mikhail
Kalugin, Director of the Fourth Department of the CIS Countries at the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, together with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, is
seeking to reach a consensus on relocating the discussions from Geneva to
another venue. The Russian side cites Switzerland’s loss of
neutrality as the reason for this initiative, arguing that the negotiations
should continue in an environment that all participants consider neutral and
acceptable.
Moscow’s position is, of course,
not merely about the geographical location of the negotiations. The Geneva
International Discussions are an important component of the security framework
established following the August 2008 war. The format brings together
representatives of Georgia, Russia, the United States, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, while the process is co-chaired by the European Union, the United
Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
The discussions encompass two
principal areas: security and humanitarian concerns. This format assumes
particular significance in the absence of diplomatic relations between Georgia
and Russia, at a time when the safety of conflict-affected communities, freedom
of movement, the return of internally displaced persons and a range of
humanitarian challenges remain unresolved.
A distinguishing feature of the
Geneva format is that it is a negotiating mechanism established with the
involvement of international mediators, designed to manage the consequences of
the conflict and to sustain dialogue between the parties. It follows that the
question of relocating the talks cannot be regarded as a merely technical
decision.
Russia’s invocation of
Switzerland’s neutrality represents nothing more than Moscow’s official
justification. For Georgia, however, it is of paramount importance to ensure
that any change does not alter the political foundations of the negotiations or
weaken the existing international framework.
Border Delimitation and
Demarcation – Another Aspect of Russia’s Demands
Alongside the initiative to
relocate the Geneva International Discussions, the Kremlin has for several
years been insisting on the need for Georgia to provide legally binding
guarantees on the non-use of force against the populations of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and to conclude a corresponding agreement. Furthermore, according to Kalugin, the
initiation of the process of delimiting the Georgia–Abkhazia and Georgia–South
Ossetia borders, followed by their demarcation, is also on the agenda.
According to Georgia’s official
position, Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region lie within Georgia’s
internationally recognised borders, and Russia’s recognition of their
independence violates Georgia’s territorial integrity.
It is therefore essential to
distinguish between the dividing lines resulting from the conflict and the
legal status of internationally recognised state borders. Any negotiations must
be based on respect for Georgia’s territorial integrity and must not create
conditions for restricting its sovereignty or altering the status of the
occupied territories.
On the other hand, the issue of
the non-use of force is an important matter from a security perspective.
However, it cannot be considered in isolation from the broader context of the
conflict, the responsibilities of the parties, international law and effective
security guarantees. It is important for Georgia to ensure that such issues do
not become a mechanism for satisfying unilateral political demands.
Russia’s Attempts to Strengthen
the Regional Agenda
In addition to the Geneva
International Discussions, Moscow is also raising the issue of Georgia’s
participation in other cooperation formats in the South Caucasus. One of these
is the ‘3+3’ regional cooperation platform, which brings together the three South
Caucasus states – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan – and their three
neighbouring countries: Russia, Türkiye and Iran.
The idea of establishing this
format was put forward by the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Türkiye in late
2020. Meetings have already been held within the framework of the platform at
the level of deputy foreign ministers and foreign ministers. Georgia has not
participated in its activities to date.
According
to Mikhail Kalugin, a representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the ‘3+3’ platform has significant potential to promote stability and
economic development in the region. Moscow identifies transport,
logistics, energy, telecommunications, culture and education as potential areas
of cooperation. According to Kalugin, the platform remains open to Georgia, and
Tbilisi can join at any time.
This offer from Russia is
accompanied by other messages: in Moscow’s view, the problems of the South
Caucasus should be resolved by the states of the region and their immediate
neighbours themselves, without interference from external powers. However, for
Georgia, the issue is not limited to opportunities for economic cooperation.
Among the participants in the format is Russia, which occupies part of
Georgia’s territory and recognises the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Therefore, participation in the platform also has political and
security dimensions.
Expansion of the Special
Representative’s Mandate – What Risks Does This Decision Pose?
Against this backdrop, the
expansion of the mandate of the Georgian Prime Minister’s Special
Representative for Relations with Russia warrants particular attention. The decision was met with
criticism from the Diplomatic Society of Georgia (DSG), which brings together
career diplomats from different generations.
In the Society’s assessment, the
decision signals a dangerous trend: as Prime Minister Kobakhidze announced when
introducing the representative, the peaceful resolution of the conflict with
Russia has now been added to the Special Representative’s remit. Hitherto, the
mandate had principally encompassed economic, cultural and humanitarian
matters, and meetings were informal in character.
Mr Kobakhidze’s decision to vest
the representative with a new mandate may be construed as an attempt to create
a direct alternative to the Geneva International Discussions. The addition of
this function runs counter to the established approach in the absence of
diplomatic relations, and risks diminishing the significance of the Geneva
format.
Russia’s recent statements
suggest that Moscow is seeking to advance its own vision of regional
cooperation in the South Caucasus. In these circumstances, Georgia faces the
considerable challenge of simultaneously preserving avenues for dialogue,
upholding the principle of territorial integrity and preventing any
transformation of the international negotiating format that would weaken its
position.
In this context, the expansion of
the Special Representative’s mandate requires a particularly cautious approach.
It is important that the authorities clearly explain to the public the
objectives and scope of the new mandate, as well as its relationship with the
Geneva International Discussions.
ოკუპირებულ აფხაზეთში რუსეთის მიერ წარმოებული პასპორტიზაციის პოლიტიკა ახალ, გაცილებით აგრესიულ ფაზაში შედის.
In Georgia, while 2024–2026 is described as a period of significant deterioration in media rights, signs of increased state-led political influence over independent and public-interest media had become visible earlier.
Since 2024, Georgia’s legal and institutional framework has been changing at an unusually rapid pace.